

Message Text

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FOR POLADS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GE, GW, UR, WB

SUBJ: THE SOVIET-GDR MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TREATY:

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

REF: A. BERLIN 6499

B. MOSCOW 14464

C. MOSCOW 12769

D. MOSCOW 13681 (NOTAL)

E. MOSCOW 14181 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY. THE NEW SOVIET-GDR MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TREATY HAS IMPLICATIONS IN THREE MAIN AREAS: THE CONCEPT OF GERMANY; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND DEPENDENCE; AND WARSAW PACT RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE--AND BEYOND EUROPE TO CHINA. ON THE QUESTION OF GERMAN NATIONHOOD, THE TREATY COULD HAVE BEEN WORSE, AS FAR AS FRG INTERESTS ARE CONCERNED. THE SOVIET UNION HAS EVIDENTLY GONE ABOUT AS FAR AS IT WANTS IN PARTITIONING GERMANY AND DEVALUING THE IDEA OF GERMAN STATEHOOD. TO GO FURTHER WOULD BE TO REDUCE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS RESERVED WARTIME RIGHTS, WHICH IT CONTINUES TO FIND NOT ONLY USEFUL BUT INDISPENSABLE. THE TERMS OF THE TREATY--AND RECENT GDR ACTIONS--MAY INDICATE THAT MOSCOW HAS THE GDR OVER SOME SORT OF BARREL, AND THAT BARREL IS PROBABLY THE KIND THAT OIL OR GRAIN COMES IN. IN ANY CASE, THE NEW TREATY PROVIDES FOR INCREASED INTEGRATION AND APPEARS TO HOLD OUT TO THE GDR THE PROMISE OF GREATER PARTICIPATION IN EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET ENERGY RESOURCES. THE NEW TREATY'S CLEVER UTILIZATION OF THE QA LANGUAGE ON WEST BERLIN DEVALUES THE QA LANGUAGE ON FRG TIES TO THAT CITY, AND SHOULD, IN OUR JUDGMENT, BE COUNTERED. WE SUGGEST A POSSIBLE METHOD. FINALLY, ON WARSAW PACT RELATIONS, THE GDR'S ACCEPTANCE OF MUTUAL DEFENSE OBLIGATIONS EVEN BEYOND THE BORDERS OF EUROPE FOLLOWS CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S 1970 FOOTSTEPS IN THAT DIRECTION AND CONSTITUTES FURTHER PIECEMEAL REVISION OF THE PACT. IT SERVES TO LINE UP ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES TO DO IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL BATTLE AGAINST THE MAOISTS. WE SEE THE SOVIETS PURSUING A CAUTIOUS, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO CONSOLIDATING EASTERN EUROPE, ESPECIALLY ITS VITAL NORTHERN TIER, CONFIDENTIAL

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ALONG JUST THESE LINES, AND NOTE THAT WITH THE GDR FIRMLY ON BOARD, POLAND IS NOW ODD MAN OUT IN THE NORTH. END SUMMARY.

2. GERMANY. THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO WANT TO HAVE ITS GERMAN CAKE AND EAT IT TOO. IT HAS DROPPED ALL REFERENCE IN ITS NEW TREATY WITH THE GDR TO ANY NEED FOR, OR THE DESIRABILITY OF, A GERMAN PEACE TREATY. AND BY REFERRING TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE GDR AS A "FULL MEMBER" OF THE UNITED

NATIONS, AND BY A VAGUE REFERENCE TO "CHANGES IN EUROPE", IT FURTHER IMPLIES THAT THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS NOW FULLY SETTLED. BUT THIS RAISES THE QUESTION AS TO WHY THE TREATY DID NOT COME RIGHT OUT AND SAY, IN SO MANY WORDS, THAT MOSCOW CONSIDERS THAT CSCE (OR WHATEVER) HAS CLOSED THE BOOKS ON THE WAR.

3. AT LEAST ONE REASON WHY THE SOVIETS PREFER NOT TO ATTACK THE ISSUE SO DIRECTLY IS SPELLED OUT IN ARTICLE 10 OF THE NEW TREATY, WHICH IS ALMOST AN EXACT REPLAY OF A CORRESPONDING ARTICLE IN THE 1964 TREATY; MOSCOW CONTINUES TO INSIST ON PRESERVATION OF ITS WARTIME RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN GERMANY. OR ALL OF ITS DECLARED (AND PROBABLY REAL) INTEREST IN GAINING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION FOR THE GRD AS AN INDEPENDENT AND (ALLEGEDLY) FULLY SOVEREIGN STATE, THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT WANT--INDEED REFUSES--TO WITHDRAW ITS FINGER FROM THE GERMAN PIE. THE SLAVISHNESS OF THE SED--SYMBOLIZED BY THE FACT THAT THE THREE TOP LEADERS OF THE GDR WERE IN MOSCOW PAYING COURT TO THE KREMLIN ON THEIR OWN NATIONAL DAY--IS NOT A SUFFICIENT GUARANTEE TO IT OF ITS STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN GERMANY. THE KREMLIN FINDS THE LEGAL RIGHTS FLOWING FROM ITS WARTIME ROLE AS CONQUEROR INDISPENSABLE IN AIDING ITS DEFENSE OF THESE REAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND ALSO AS A STICK WITH WHICH TO BEAT THE ALLIES AND THE FRG IN BERLIN, THE FRG ON ITS OWN TERRITORY, AND, NOT LAST, THE GDR IN ANY CURRENT AND FUTURE FORUMS.

4. THE NEW TREATY APPEARS TO PUT MORE STRESS ON DEFENSE OF THE GDR, ITS BORDERS, AND ITS "SOCIALIST ACHIEVEMENTS" EVEN THAN THE 1964 TREATY. FURTHERMORE, HONECKER'S GROVELING PRAISE OF BREZHNEV AND THE CPSU AS THE GUIDING LIGHT FOR THE

WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN HIS OCT 6 SPEECH IN THE KREMLIN
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IS THE MOST SERVILE WE HAVE SEEN IN THE SOVIET PRESS IN YEARS. WE NOTE THE EMPHASIS HONECKER GAVE IN HIS KREMLIN SPEECH TO JOINT USE AND EXPLITATION OF NOT ONLY INTELLECTUAL BUT ALSO "MATERIAL" RESOURCES. THE TREATY ITSELF CONTAINS MUCH THE SAME LANGUAGE. THE QUESTION WHICH ARISES IS WHETHER "MATERIAL" REFERS TO OIL OR, AS AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV'S RECENT REMARKS TO FRENCH (REF A) SUGGEST, GRAINS OR HARD CURRENCY TO BUY GRAINS.

5. WEST BERLIN. BY LIFITING THE LANGUAGE FROM THE QA WHICH CONSTITUTES THE FRG'S MAIN CLAIM ON TIES TO THE WESTERN SECTOR AND APPLYING IT TO THEIR OWN RELATIONSHIP TOWEST BERLIN, THE SOVIETS AND EAST GERMANS HAVE NEATLY DEVALUED THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE QA'S PRONOUNCEMENT ON FRG-WEST BERLIN RELATIONS. THE FRG WOULD BE HARD PRESSED TO DENY THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS SOME SORT OF "TIES"WHICH IT CAN

"MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP". AND IT WOULD BE EQUALLY DIFFICULT TO INSIST THAT THERE ARE NO "TIES" BETWEEN EAST BERLIN AND WEST BERLIN; TO DO SO WOULD RUN COUNTER TO THE THESIS THAT GERMANY RETAINS AT LEAST SOME SEMBLANCE OF NATIONHOOD.

6. WE MIGHT WELL CONSIDER MEANS OF COUNTERING THIS NEW SOVIET PLOY. THE SOVIET MOVE CLEARLY CALLS INTO QUESTION THE BARGAIN, REACHED IN MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, BY WHICH THE FRG'S "MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP TIES" WAS BALANCED OFF AGAINST THE EAST'S "CONTINUES NOT TO BE A CONSTITUENT PARTY." PRELIMINARY SOVIET PRESS PLAY ON THE AGREEMENT HAS SO FAR AVOIDED ANY EMPHASIS ON THE NEW TREATY'S LANGUAGE ON WEST BERLIN, BUT MOSCOW WILL OBVIOUSLY NOT HESITATE TO MAKE USE OF IT WHEN THE NEED ARISES.

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7. ONE POSSIBLE TACTIC WHICH OCCURS TO US WOULD BE A SENAT RESOLUTION REAFFIRMING ITS SUPPORT OF THE QA AND WELCOMING AN INCREASE IN CONTACT WITH THE GDR AND EAST BERLIN, BUT EMPHASIZING THAT THE WESTERN SECTOR'S TIES ITH THE FRG IN ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, AND LEGAL AREAS ARE, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE QA, OF AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT QUALITY THAN ITS ITES TO THE GDR. THE ALLIES COULD THEN CONSIDER PUBLICLY SUPPORTING THE RESOLUTION IN A PRESS STATEMENT.

8. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. COMPARISION OF ARTICLE 2 ON ECONOMIC TIES WITH ARTICLE 8 IN THE 1964 TREATY CLEARLY REFLECTS THE INCRESED EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION SINCE THE LAUNCHING OF THE CEMA COMPLEX PROGRAM IN THE SUMMER OF 1971, AND THE FACT THAT THE GDR HAS BEEN PLAYING A LARGER ROLE IN CEMA ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ACTIVITY IN RECENT YEARS. FURTHERMORE, GDR-SOVIET BILATERAL ECONOMIC TIES ARE ALREADY EXTREMELY STRONG AND ARE BY ALL ODDS THE MOST IMPORTANT IN ANY SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP. THE LANGUAGE IN ARTICLE 2 THUS INDICATES A PLANNED ACCELERATION OF ECONOMIC LINKS WHICH ARE ALREADY MAJOR. ON THE OTHER HAND, PERHAPS REFLECTING THE GDR'S TRADITIONAL PREFERENCE FOR BILATERAL ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE USSR, ARTICLE 2 OF THE SOVIET-CZECH 1970 TREATY COMMITS BOTH PARTIES TO "SOCIALIST ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF CEMA MEMBER STATES" WHILE THE NEW GDR TREATY MERELY HAS THEM STRENGTHENING "BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL..COOPERATION, INCLUDING WITHIN THE CEMA FRAMEWORK."

9. AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN A SOVIET ECONOMIC JOURNAL (VESTNIK) ON OCT 7 REFERS TO PLANS FOR GDR SUPPLY TO THE USSR OVER PERIOD 1976-1980 OF CHEMICAL AND METALLURGICAL COMPLEXES, IN RETURN FOR EXTENSIVE CAPITAL EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES TO THE GDR FROM THE SOVIET UNION. MENTION IS ALSO MADE OF SPECIAL

PLANS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF GDR FUEL AND ENERGY SUPPLIES, SOME OF WHICH WILL INCLUDE GDR CONSTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS ON SOVIET TERRITORY -- APPARENTLY AS PAYMENT FOR "ADDITIONAL" SOVIET ENERGY DELIVERIES.

10. WARSAW PACT, EASTERN EUROPE AND CHINA. FINALLY, THE GDR APPEARS IN ARTICLE 8 TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE OBLIGATION TO DEFEND
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THE SOVIET UNION'S NON-EUROPEAN FRONTIERS, BY DROPPING THE LIMITATION "IN EUROPE" WHICH APPEARED IN ARTICLE 5 OF THE 1964 TREATY, AND WHICH DEFINES THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN IN THE 1955 WARSAW TREATY. TO BE SURE, THE NEW TREATY CONTAINS A NUMBER OF SAVING CLAUSES: THE PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE ON STRICT OBSERVANCE OF "THE OBLIGATIONS FLOWING FROM THE WARSAW TREATY" AND ON "THE GOALS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER," THE LANGUAGE IN ARTICLE 6 STATING "THE FIRM DETERMINATION...TO SECURE THE INVIOABILITY OF THE FRONTIERS OF (WARSAW TREATY) MEMBER STATES" "IN ALLIANCE WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW TREATY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH IT," THE ARTICLE 8 REFERENCE TO COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE "IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER," AND ARTICLE 10, WHICH STATES THAT THE NEW TREATY DOES NOT AFFECT RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS IN EFFECT. BUT THE SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK TREATY OF MAY 6, 1970, WHICH WAS THE FIRST INSTANCE WHERE ANOTHER WARSAW PACT STATE UNDERTOOK TO ASSIST THE SOVIET UNION MILITARILY OUTSIDE EUROPE, CONTAINS MOST OF THE SAME SAVING LANGUAGE. (FRG EMBASSY EXPERTS CLAIM THAT IN ADDITION TO CZECH TREATY THERE ARE OTHER POST-1968 SOVIET TREATIES WITH EAST EUROPE WHICH PROVIDE FOR DEFENSE OF NON-EUROPEAN WP BOUNDARIES; WE WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION.) WE NOTE ONLY TWO DISTINCTIONS. FIRST, THE CZECHS IN ARTICLE 9 OF THEIR TREATY ARE OBLIGATED TO UNDERTAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO PREVENT AND REBUFF AGGRESSION "FROM ANY FORCE OF MILITARISM AND REVANCHISM," WHILE THE EAST GERMANS (UNDER ARTICLE 4) WILL NOW UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES "FOR THE DEFENSE AND PRESERVATION OF THE HISTORIC CONQUESTS OF SOCIALISM, AND THE SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF BOTH COUNTRIES." (THIS MIGHT WELL IMPLY GDR WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND MONGOLIA--AS A "HISTORIC CONQUEST OF SOCIALISM"--AS WELL AS THE ASIAN BORDERS OF THE USSR.) THE FRG AMBASSADOR HERE HAS CHARACTERIZED THIS PASSAGE, AND INDEED THE TREATY IN GENERAL, AS "THE EMBODIMENT OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE." SECOND, THE SOVIETS AND CZECHS IN ARTICLE 12 SIMPLY DECLARED THAT INTERNATIONAL TREATIES IN EFFECT DID NOT CONTRADICT THE PROVISIONS OF THEIR NEW TREATY. NO DOUBT, THE SAVING CLAUSES IN BOTH TREATIES WOULD BE A SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR REAL ARGUMENT IN THE EVENT THE SOVIETS ACTUALLY SOUGHT TO INVOKE CZECHOSLOVAK OR EAST GERMAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE ON THEIR NON-EUROPEAN FRONTIERS. HOWEVER, THIS ONLY GOES TO CONFIRM

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THAT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OBLIGATIONS IS IN ANY CASE PRIMARILY POLITICAL. THUS, AS WE READ IT, THE GDR HAS NOW FOLLOWED CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS THE SECOND WARSAW PACT COUNTRY COMMITTED BY TREATY TO ASSIST THE SOVIET UNION MILITARILY OUTSIDE THE ORIGINAL GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS OF WARSAW PACT OBLIGATIONS.

11. POLITICALLY, THIS REPRESENTS PIECEMEAL EXTENSION OF THE WARSAW PACT, ON THE ONE HAND, AND GDR SUPPORT (FOLLOWING CZECHOSLOVAKIA) OF THE SOVIET UNION AGAINST CHINA. IT FOLLOWS LOGICALLY ON THE THEME OF CONSOLIDATION OF WARSAW PACT INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH GROMYKO AND GRECHKO GREETED THE WP 20TH ANNIVERSARY THIS SUMMER AND WHICH GROMYKO PICKED UP AGAIN IN HIS SEPTEMBER KOMMUNIST ARTICLE (REF B). IT ALSO FOLLOWS FROM THE THESIS IN THE AUGUST KOMMUNIST ANTI-CHINA ARTICLE THAT IT IS NOW THE DUTY OF SOCIALIST STATES (AND NOT JUST PARTIES) TO OPPOSE THE MAOISTS (REF C). WE ALSO SEE IT AS CONFIRMING THE IMPLICATION WE DREW IN OUR ANALYSIS (REF D) OF THE BREZHNEV-ZARODOV MEETING THAT ONE EFFECT OF THE TOUGH ANTI-MAOIST STANCE IN KOMMUNIST AND THE TOUGHER SYMBOLISM OF THE ZARODOV MEETING WOULD BE TO REINFORCE DISCIPLINE IN THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE IT IS ALREADY ENFORCED: COMMUNIST NORTH-EASTERN EUROPE AND BULGARIA. FINALLY, IT LENDS SOME SUPPORT TO THE SUPPOSITION THAT THE SOVIETS AND EAST GERMANS HAVE BEEN BARGAINING ABOUT MILITARY ISSUES, INCLUDING WARSAW PACT CONSOLIDATION (REF E), OR, AS WE NOW SEE, PIECEMEAL REVISION.

12. WITH CZECHOSLOVAK AND GDR SIGNATURES ON BOARD, POLAND IS NOW THE HOLDOUT IN NORTHEASTERN EUROPE WHEN IT COMES TO DEFENDING THE SOVIET UNION'S NON-EUROPEAN FRONTIERS (AND ATTACKING CHINA), AND, GIVEN THE FACT THAT POLAND IS THE SOVIET UNION'S LARGEST ALLY, AT SOME POINT WE WOULD EXPECT STEPPED-UP SOVIET PRESSURE ON WARSAW TO JOIN WHAT HAS NOW BECOME A CROWD.
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